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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS CAUGHT IN THE QUAGMIRE OF A
STATE ACTION
As communications in society advance technologically, the First
Amendment has served as the guardian of this growth. However, some-
times technological advances in communications create problems that
are not dealt with by existing First Amendment case law. Such a circum-
stance has arisen with media pooling agreements., WPIX, Inc. v. League
of Women Voters2 ("WPIX") brought to light one such circumstance,
when, in 1984, the League of Women Voters implemented a media pool-
ing agreement for the broadcast coverage of the 1984 presidential and
vice-presidential debates. WPIX was dissatisfied with this agreement
and sought an injunction to gain access to the debates.3 This case raises
several First Amendment issues, but the fundamental issue was to deter-
mine when a private actor's actions constitute a state action for purposes
of invoking the First Amendment.4
I. MEDIA POOLING AGREEMENTS
The history of media pooling agreements is nebulous at best. Volun-
tary press pools have been, and are, used by reporters out of the need for
professional cooperation.5 These voluntary pooling arrangements were
1. WPIX, Inc. v. League of Women Voters, 595 F. Supp. 1484 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The
League of Women Voters' television consultant explained how media pools work: "pooled
coverage allows every television news organization access to the same pictures and sounds of
an event and makes its coverage available to all. Any organization who participates in the pool
and shares its product (feed) also shares equally in the cost of coverage." Id. at 1489.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See infra note 39. The WPIX court found that it was not clear whether WPIX was
likely to win on the merits of its First Amendment claim, and thus did not grant the injunc-
tion. The court was not persuaded that the importance of WPIX's news gathering activity and
the degree of the restraint imposed by the pooling agreements were greater than the state
interest served. Thus, the court went on to address whether WPIX would have been irrepara-
bly harmed and whether there were any equitable considerations favoring WPIX. The court
here found that WPIX was not irreparably harmed in that WPIX could re-edit the feed to
provide its own perspective of the debates. Additionally, all the equitable considerations went
against WPIX. The court mainly focused on what it characterized as WPIX's concern for
economic profit rather than a true concern for loss of First Amendment freedoms. Also rele-
vant was WPIX's failure to appear at the League's first meeting at which the pooling agree-
ment was discussed, and WPIX's failure to object in a more timely fashion.
5. Interview with Charles L. Whipple, reporter, editor of the editorial page, and
ombudsman for the Boston Globe from 1936 to 1978 (Dec. 28, 1986).
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frequently used during the Eisenhower and subsequent presidential cam-
paigns. Voluntary pools were used when numerous events occurred si-
multaneously and a single reporter representing a news organization was
unable to cover all of the events.6 As a result, reporters would make
informal agreements among themselves whereby each reporter would
cover one of the events. After the events were over, the reporters would
share their notes.7
As presidential campaigns became more widely covered by the press
during the sixties, access to the candidates became increasingly limited.
This was because it was no longer physically or temporally feasible for all
of the reporters to have access to the candidates. One consequence was
that President Kennedy, during the 1960 presidential campaign, had a
single reporter traveling with him. The reporter that Kennedy chose was
Robert L. Healy of the Boston Globe, who frequently traveled with Ken-
nedy on his plane. Mr. Healy in turn passed information on to his col-
leagues who represented other news organizations. This was an informal
arrangement, however, and Mr. Healy tended to keep the more spectacu-
lar stories to himself.'
By the 1970's, coverage of presidential campaigns had become more
sophisticated. Part of this sophistication was a standardization of media
pools. For example, in 1971, during the George McGovern presidential
campaign:
[e]veryday a "pool" of one or two reporters was delegated to
stay close to the candidate at those times (i.e., during motor-
cades, small dinners, fund raising parties) when the entire press
corps could not follow him. . . . After each event, the pool
wrote a report which was posted in the press room, and was
usually xeroxed by the candidate's press staff and distrib-
uted .... The reports usually dealt in trivia-what the candi-
date ate, what he said, whose hand he had shaken.9




9. TIMOTHY CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE Bus (1972). "It wasn't long before White
House Press Secretaries began to see that the news might be controlled or manipulated
through pooling agreements. If they pooled correspondents who were friendly and favorable
toward the president as the 'pool,' the chances were that only favorable stuff would be given to
the rest of the press corps; also, hostile critical questions were less likely to be asked. White
House press coverage would also be at least partially controlled by having the President call
for questions mostly from correspondents he knew were friendly." Letter from Charles L.
Whipple, (October 30, 1986)(discussing media pools).
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lowing the campaign." °
The use of media pools has not been limited to the coverage of polit-
ical campaigns. Due to space limitations and security considerations, the
number of media representatives covering a presidential event often must
be limited, thus requiring the use of pools." Consequently, media pools
have been frequently used by President Reagan and his predecessors.
12
For example, during the Eisenhower Administration, when Prime Minis-
ter Nehru of India visited the White House, President Eisenhower only
allowed a few reporters into the White House to interview the Prime
Minister. In turn, these reporters were required to share their interviews
with other reporters. 3
Additionally, media pools have commonly been used during mili-
tary operations, where unregulated access would otherwise force the mil-
itary to exclude the media entirely.' 4 In response to the dissatisfaction
expressed by journalists in not being allowed to cover the invasion of
Grenada, the Pentagon selected a pool of eleven journalists to accom-
pany American forces into battle.' 5 There are other military situations
that create the need for media pools. For example, because of limited
satellite access and other technical restrictions during the Falkland Is-
land war in 1982, United States broadcast news organizations had to
pool their coverage of the war.'
6
With the advent of news cameras in state courtrooms, 17 courts have
developed rules limiting the number of cameras allowed access, requiring
news organizations to pool their coverage of trials.' 8 Cameras have also
been required to be pooled in the coverage of executions.' 9
10. TIMOTHY CROUSE, THE BOYS ON THE Bus (1972).
11. Cable News Network v. CBS, 518 F. Supp. 1238, 1239-40 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
12. Id.
13. Interview with Charles L. Whipple, supra note 5.
14. WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1489.
15. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 11, 1984, at 10, col. 1. The decision to form a standing pool
of reporters grew out of the uproar that followed the Pentagon's exclusion of journalists from
last year's invasion of Grenada. General John Vessey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
appointed a commission of military officials and retired journalists to devise a plan for allowing
reporters to observe future American military operations, even if the operations are launched
on short notice.... The panel recommended that the Pentagon form a pool of reporters who
could accompany American troops and file reports to be distributed to news organizations if
military leaders deemed it impossible to allow broader coverage of battles. Id.
16. Interview with Tom Hall, Engineer for KNBC News, Los Angeles (Nov. 15, 1986).
17. See Note, Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for State Criminal Trials, 84 MIcH. L.
REV. 475 (1985).
18. Id.
19. See Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
1987]
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Today, the major networks routinely use pooling agreements. 20 The
networks find pooling agreements necessary when they do not have the
resources to cover a variety of news events or because of space limita-
tions.21 Space limitations are caused in part because of the increase in
the number of news broadcasters resulting from the addition of cable
broadcasters. Also, increased camera coverage of public events has oc-
curred because of technological advancements, such as the development
of small, affordable portable video recorders, which allow a television
station to cover more events.22
II. WPIX CASE
In WPIX, the plaintiff, WPIX, operated a local television station
and produced daily half-hour national news programs, which it syndi-
cated through its Independent Network News ("INN") division to UHF
stations nationwide. The defendant League of Women Voters ("the
League"), arranged the 1984 presidential and vice-presidential debates.23
On September 18, 1984, the League issued a press release notifying the
media community of a meeting to discuss the television coverage of the
debates. The meeting was called for September 19 and National Broad-
casting Company, Columbia Broadcasting System, and American Broad-
casting Companies attended. The three networks offered to form a pool.
No other pool proposals were received by the League, nor did any other
organization request to participate in the pool.
24
On October 5, 1984, INN demanded access for its cameras to the
debates, the first of which was scheduled for October 7. INN claimed
that the fee being charged by the feed from the pool was excessive. The
League rejected these demands.25
20. Interview with Tom Hall, supra note 14.
21. Id. As an example, such a situation could arise during a natural catastrophe. Limita-
tions could be caused by a lack of physical access to the site, e.g., an explosion of a volcano
causing restriction by the state on the number of vehicles allowed access in the area of the
explosion or, there may be a limited number of satellite transponders available at a given geo-
graphical location. Thus, television news organizations would have to share coverage of the
event and possible time or feed to and from a satellite transponder. Id. The WPIX case is an
example of the need for a pooling agreement because of limited space
22. Wall Street Journal, May 12, 1975, at 26, col. I. "Since 1975 with the utilization of
videotape, it has been much easier and cheaper for a television news station to cover an event.
Video tape cameras, because of compactness, allow cameras access to areas not otherwise
available to the more bulky traditional cameras." Thus, television stations can cover more
events. Id.
23. WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1488-89.
24. Id. at 1485-86.
25. Id. at 1486. In an October 5 letter to the League, the president of INN stated: "You
[Vol. 7
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On October 9, INN demanded access to the vice-presidential debate
scheduled for October 21. As an alternative to access for its cameras,
INN requested access to the pool on a reasonable financial basis. Again
the League rejected INN's demands.26
On October 10, WPIX filed a temporary restraining order to pro-
hibit the League from denying INN's cameras access to the final debates.
The application for preliminary injunctive relief was denied as to the
vice-presidential debate and the court ordered an expedited discovery as
to whether relief should be granted for the final presidential debate.
WPIX moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the League from
denying INN's cameras access to the final presidential debate, based on a
denial of their First Amendment rights.27
The League argued that no infringement of WPIX's First Amend-
ment rights had occurred because there was no state action.28 First, the
League argued that it had decided unilaterally to require pooled coverage
of the debates, without any input from President Reagan, former Vice-
President Mondale, or their representatives.2 9 Second, it argued that
"[i]rrespective of the degree of candidate involvement in the debate for-
mat, cooperation with political candidates does not turn the League's
decision regarding pooled coverage into a form of state action."3
Before determining whether WPIX was entitled to injunctive relief,
the WPIX court had to first determine if a state action existed. Constitu-
tional restrictions do not apply to private parties unless the court finds
that a state action exists. 31 The court found a state action because, ac-
cording to its analysis, the League's actions were sufficiently interwoven
with the state to bring the League under the purview of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.32
In finding a state action, the court applied a five-prong test set forth
have also failed to adopt appropriate pool arrangements that would allow us reasonable access
to Sunday night's [presidential] debate." Id.
26. Id. at 1486.
27. Id. at 1486-87.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1487.
30. Id. at 1488.
31. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) states:
Every person who under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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in Jackson v. Statler Foundation.33 However, rather than show which
facts supported which prong of the test and why, the WPIX court simply
listed the applicable facts along with the relevant case law and concluded
that the requirements of the test were met.34
The WPIX court first focused on the public nature of the candidates.
In addressing the candidates' role in the debates, the court pointed to the
fact that the current president and former vice-president of the United
States were involved. The court stated that the League was not acting
unilaterally, as it claimed it was, but that the president and vice-president
were actively involved in the execution of the debates. According to the
court, it was necessary for the League to get the concurrence of both men
on the format of the debate, which effectively was an approval of the
pool coverage. Additionally, the fact that the candidates received mil-
lions of dollars in public campaign financing and were protected by the
Secret Service appeared to be important to the court.35
The court also focused on the nature of the debates. The court
found that the League was extensively regulated in that the "debates
were broadcast over the airwaves in accordance with regulations promul-
gated by the Federal Election Commission and the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.
36
Next, the court looked at the public nature of the League itself. The
court found that the League had "institutionalized" its role by being se-
lected as the organizers of the presidential debates for the last three presi-
dential elections. The court also found that the League was serving a
public purpose in providing the debates.37
Finally, the court considered, as relevant the fact that the League's
decision to pool coverage may have had substantial First Amendment
considerations; thus, it looked at the public policy benefits of finding a
state action.38
The court concluded that these facts were sufficient to find that
33. 496 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). The test for a state
action articulated in Statler was as follows: (1) The degree to which the private organization is
dependent on governmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental scheme;
(3) whether that scheme connotes government approval of the activity or whether the assist-
ance is merely provided to all without such connotations; (4) the extent to which the organiza-
tion serves a public function or acts as surrogate for the state; and (5) whether the organization
has legitimate claims to recognition as a private organization in association or other constitu-
tional terms. Id. at 629.
34. WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1487-89.






WPIX had "raised a substantial possibility that it will be able to prove
that the League's decision to deny access to any but the pooled cameras
[was a] state action."39
III. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
In order to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been
violated when a private entity holds a public event and excludes certain
media representatives from covering that event, the first question to re-
solve is whether or not a state action exists.4° A state action must be
established in order to bring a potentially private defendant within the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Application of the Second Circuit Test
The test articulated in Jackson v. Statler Foundation4" combined the
approaches taken by the Supreme Court before 1973 in determining
whether or not there was a state action. If the WPIX court had properly
applied the elements of the Statler test to the facts of the case, they
would have found that no state action existed. The first element of the
test required a court to examine "[t]he degree to which the private organ-
ization is dependent on governmental aid." In the court's decision there
is no mention of the League receiving or being dependent on any govern-
mental aid. The court confused public financing of the candidates with
the League's role in the debates. It is the League that must be receiving
the governmental aid in order for this element of the test to apply.
39. Id. The court based its decision that there was probably a state action on Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). This case involved the operator of a restau-
rant who refused to serve the plaintiff because he was black. The restaurant was located in a
parking structure which was owned and operated by the Wilmington Parking Authority, an
agency of the State of Delaware. Before getting to the equal protection aspects of the case, the
court had first to determine if a state action existed. This case developed the "symbiotic rela-
tionship test," used to determine if a state action exists when a private party is involved. In
view of the facts of this case, that the restaurant was physically and financially an integral part
of a public building, built and maintained with public funds, devoted to a public parking ser-
vice, and used and operated by an agency of the state for public purposes, the state was a joint
participant in the operation of the restaurant, and its refusal to serve the plaintiff violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burton, 365 U.S. 715.
In coming to its conclusion that a state action existed, the Supreme Court added: "Only
by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the state in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." After weighing the circumstances, the
Court concluded that "the State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with the defendant that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity
.... " Id. at 720.
40. WPIX, 595 F. Supp. at 1491-93. See supra note 31 and accompaning text.
41. 496 F.2d 623, 629 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975).
1987]
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The second element of the test was "the extent and intrusion of the
governmental regulatory scheme." The court held that because the de-
bates were broadcast in accordance with both the Federal Election Com-
mission ("FEC") and the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") regulations, the League was a highly regulated entity.42 FCC
regulations, however, are not relevant to the League because the League
was not broadcasting the debates-the networks were, and such regula-
tions would only apply to broadcasters.43 Similarly, FEC regulations ap-
ply to candidates and campaigning, not to the holding of debates." It is
the League's conduct in relation to the managing of the debates and the
media pools that must fall within extensive governmental regulation to
meet this element of the test. Thus, for the League to meet this element
of the test they must directly be regulated, and the court made no men-
tion of any regulations directly concerning the League.
The third element of the Statler test-"whether that scheme con-
notes government approval of the activity or whether the assistance is
merely provided to all without such connotations"-is also not met by
the facts of this case. This element depends on the second element being
met, for there must be a governmental scheme to promote and regulate
debates.45 Even if the second element were met, the third element would
not have been met because neither the FEC nor the FCC regulations
encouraged or approved the League's conduct in holding presidential
and vice-presidential debates.
Next, the court looked at "the extent to which the organization
serves a public function or acts as a surrogate for the state." This was
probably the strongest argument favoring the WPIX court's decision.
The court primarily focused on the facts related to this element. In par-
ticular, it noted that the League's motive for sponsoring the debates was
to provide a public service by educating voters, and that the debates were
public in nature. However, there is a difference between providing a pub-
lic service and performing a public function. A public function is a func-
tion that has traditionally exclusively been performed by the state, such
42. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1986) only applies to broadcasters using interstate transmissions, and
in no way would encompass the League as a sponsor of debates (FCC); 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1982)
is designed to regulate and monitor funding for candidates campaigning for federal office
(FEC).
43. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (1982).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1986).
45. Statler, 496 F.2d at 633. The court suggested that if the government singles out a
particular segment of society, such as allowing tax exemptions to non-profit organizations, that
segment of society/organization may be laboring in the public interest, and may be participat-
ing in a state action. Id.
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as eminent domain, primaries, and providing municipal services." From
a public policy standpoint it would be imprudent to expand the scope of
public function to include public services provided by private parties. To
allow such an expansion would bring every person who performs a public
service under the scope of the Constitution, possibly discouraging pri-
vately provided services.47
Finally, the court examined "whether the organization has legiti-
mate claims to recognition as a private organization in association or
other constitutional terms." The court concluded that this element fa-
vored WPIX in finding a state action because the League did not assert
any private property rights. However, this factor in itself is not sufficient
to find that the League's conduct constituted a state action. The Statler
court in formulating this test said that each of the above factors is impor-
tant and no one factor in itself is conclusive.48
After applying each of the factors of the Statler test to the facts, it is
not persuasive that there is a state action. The problem with court's
analysis is that it lost sight of which party was supposed to have commit-
ted a state action. The court should have focused on the League and its
conduct to determine whether a state action existed, and not on the in-
dependent actions of the candidates and the news media.
Another, and perhaps more glaring, flaw in the WPIX court's opin-
ion is that it applied a Second Circuit Court of Appeals test that is possi-
bly in conflict with recent Supreme Court decisions. Not only was the
Statler decision a questionable one when decided,49 but in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions, at least, it is clearly superannuated.
46. See, e.g., Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (primaries);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company towns); Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296
(1966) (municipal parks). Additionally, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, suggested
in Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163 (1978) that state functions such as education,
tax collection, fire and police protection if delegated to a private party would no longer be
considered state functions. In a footnote in Jackson, 419 U.S. at 355 n.9, Justice Rehnquist
again writing for the majority, citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 300 (1966), stated that
the maintenance of schools is not a function traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.
47. Churches holding fundraisers, broadcasters presenting public service commercials, or
private clubs doing charity work could be defendants in a state action suit. In turn, because of
increased liability, organizations would be less inclined to perform public services.
48. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 629.
49. Statler, 496 F.2d at 629; see supra note 33. Judge Friendly in his dissent to the Statler
court's denial of reconsideration en banc, questioned the Statler decision. Judge Friendly
stated "[i]t is analytically unsound, dangerous, open-ended, and at odds with controlling prece-
dent both in the Supreme Court and in this circuit." Id. at 636.
The crux of Judge Friendly's dissent was that the standard set forth was not only un-
workable but also too lenient. The test would bring otherwise private parties under the pur-
view of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In quoting Wabba v. New York Univ., 492 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir.
1974), Judge Friendly stated "courts should pay heed, testing for government actions, to the
1987]
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B. United States Supreme Court Approach
In analyzing whether a private party's conduct is sufficient to consti-
tute a state action, the Supreme Court in the past defined state action on
a case-by-case basis. It was not until Lugar v. Edmonson Oil 50 that the
Supreme Court developed a systematic standard. According to Lugar,
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a constitutional right must
be fairly attributable to the state. 51
In determining the question of "fair attribution," (a) the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly
be said to be a state actor, either because he is a state official,
because he has acted together with or has obtained significant
aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the state, [and] (b) the deprivation must be
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the
state or by a rule of conduct imposed by it or by a person for
whom it is responsible.52
'value of preserving a private sector free of the Constitutional requirements applicable to a
government institution.'" He added that:
[t]he interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice for philanthropists is very
great. The decision will spawn countless civil rights suits against charitable founda-
tions by disgruntled minority applicants, add unnecessarily to the crushing burden
on the district courts and the courts of appeals, and, worst, of all, seriously discour-
age private philanthropy by subjecting donors to the necessity of justifying their deci-
sion in court.
Id. at 639-40.
50. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
In 1977 petitioner, a lessee-operator of a truckstop in Virginia was indebted to his
supplier, Edmonson Oil. Edmonson sued on the debt in a Virginia state court. An-
cillary to that action and pursuant to state law, Edmonson sought prejudgment at-
tachment of certain of the petitioner's property. Acting upon that petitioner [petition
submitted by Edmonson Oil], a clerk of the state court issued a writ of attachment,
which was then executed by the County sheriff. Pursuant to the statute, a hearing on
the propriety of the attachment and levy was conducted thirty-four days after the
levy, and a state court trial ordered the attachment dismissed ....
Lugar subsequently brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Edmonson Oil.
Id. at 923-24.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that there was a state action:
Edmonson's conduct could be ascribed to the government and Edmonson was a state actor
because it acted in joint participation with the state in attaching Lugar's property. However,
there was not a valid cause of action under § 1983 insofar as the plaintiff alleged misuse or
abuse of the statute, for such abuse would not have been pursuant to a government created rule
of conduct. Id. at 942.
51. Id. at 937.
52. Id. at 923. In Lugar, the Court tried to make some logical sense out of all the prior
cases, which had not followed any systematic analysis. However, in doing so, the Court has
severely restricted the breadth of the state action doctrine. Today, it is very difficult to meet
both prongs, and in applying the two-prong test to past cases, the Court would probably not
find a state action, as it did in Burton v. Wilmington Park Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Even if
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1. State Actor
The Lugar Court in formulating this two-pronged test provided that
the following be used in determining whether or not a private party could
be considered a state actor: the "public function," "symbiotic relation-
ship" and "state compulsion" tests. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., " the premise of the public function test was whether or not the
private party was performing a function traditionally reserved to the
state. The Court held that a state regulated utility company, with a par-
tial monopoly, serving the public was not a public actor.54 According to
the Jackson Court, a public function only applies when the private party
is performing a function traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.
Therefore, the supplying of electricity was not a function traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state.
5
5
Another decision cited by the Lugar Court exemplifying a public
function was Terry v. Adams. 56 The Terry decision involved a private
association known as the Jaybirds, which held closed political primaries
for Democrats running for political office. These primaries decided
which Democratic candidate the association would endorse. The result
of such an endorsement was that the candidate receiving the endorse-
ment almost always ran unopposed in the Democratic primary. The
Court held that in essence the Jaybirds were controlling a political pri-
mary and political primaries were part of the state's function. There-
fore, the Jaybirds were state actors because they were performing a state
function.57
In Marsh v. Alabama," the Court held that a private company con-
trolling a company town was performing a public function. The basis of
the Court's decision was that the company town maintained residences,
the defendant in that case was a state actor, its conduct was not pursuant to a government
created rule of conduct. See note 39.
53. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The defendant in this case was a privately owned and operated
utility corporation which held a certification of public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania
Utility Commission. The defendant was heavily regulated by the state with a partial monop-
oly. The cause of action was because the defendant discontinued electrical service to the plain-
tiff for nonpayment of past services. The plaintiff argued that a state action was present
because the respondent provided an essential public service required to be supplied on a rea-
sonably continuous basis and hence performed a public function. In rejecting this argument
the Court raised the standard for state function from traditionally, to traditionally exclusively
reserved to the state. Id. at 346-52.
54. Id. at 358.
55. Id. at 353.
56. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
57. Id. at 469-70.
58. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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streets, a system of sewers, and a business area. The town provided all
the services that a municipality otherwise would, and therefore it was
logical to conclude that the company was performing a public function. 9
The "symbiotic relationship" test mentioned by the Lugar Court
was orginally articulated in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.6°
The symbiotic relationship test is based on the notion that when govern-
mental regulations and a private party's conduct are so interwoven, they
become one in the same.6"
The final test mentioned by the Lugar Court was the "state compul-
sion" test, based on the Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.62 decision. A private
party can become a state actor when he is a medium for the state. In
other words, if the private entity chooses to perform a particular function
and, by doing so, falls within a state regulating scheme that requires the
individual to take a particular course of action, then the private individ-
ual can be subject to a state action. Not only will the private party be-
come a state actor, but he will also be pursuing an activity pursuant to a
government created rule of conduct-thus meeting both prongs of the
Lugar test.
63
2. Activity Pursuant to a Government Created Rule of Conduct
In setting out the second prong of the test, the Lugar Court focused
on two cases in particular: Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,64 and Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks.65 The Moose Lodge case involved a private club
that denied service to a black man. The only state regulation concerning
the club was a Pennsylvannia state liquor license. Although the Penn-
sylvannia Liquor Control Board required an establishment to meet cer-
tain requirements in order to retain a liquor license, the Moose Lodge
Court held that the liquor regulation did not foster or encourage racial
discrimination, thus there was no state action. In summarizing the
Moose Lodge decision, the Lugar Court stated: "the decision to discrimi-
nate could not be ascribed to any governmental decision; those govern-
59. Id. at 507-08.
60. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
61. See supra note 39.
62. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
63. An individual must put himself in the position where the state compels a particular
course of action. This is distinguishable from Lugar in that the defendant in Lugar chose to
use a state created rule of conduct by using the state's prejudgment attachment law in taking
the plaintiff's property. The defendant was not compelled in any way to attach the property
because of its position of being a warehouse and being owed money. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 932 n.
15.
64. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
65. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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mental decisions that did affect the Moose Lodge were unconnected with
its discriminatory policies."66 Thus, as the test is set forth today, prong
(b) would not be met.
The Flagg Brothers decision involved a New York statute that al-
lowed a warehouseman to sell goods stored in his warehouse if storage
fees were not paid. No hearing was necessary subsequent to the sale of
stored goods. The Flagg Brothers Court said that a private party must
both act under the color of the challenged statute and their actions must
be properly attributable to the state.67 Using this decision as support, the
Lugar Court stated that an "[a]ction by a private party pursuant to [a]
... statute, without something more, was not sufficient to justify a char-
acterization of that party as a state actor.
68
Another Supreme Court decision distinguishing between a state ac-
tor and an activity pursuant to a government created rule of conduct is
Polk County v. Dodson. 69 Here the Supreme Court found that a public
defender was a state actor, but his conduct was not pursuant to a govern-
ment created rule of conduct, so no state action existed.70 The plaintiff
brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendant, an attor-
ney in the Polk County Offender Advocate's Office, had failed to repre-
sent him adequately in an appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court. According
to the Court, a lawyer's traditional function was not to follow a govern-
mental rule of conduct, but rather was guided by professional standards
promulgated by the American Bar Association.7" Although the defend-
ant was an employee of Polk County, and thus a state actor, his conduct
was pursuant to standards created by the American Bar Association, not
pursuant to a government created rule of conduct.
7 2
Finally, in Blum v. Yaretsky,73 the Supreme Court held that a state
reimbursement to nursing homes for the care of patients, along with ex-
tensive state regulation, was not sufficient to create a state action. Here
the Court stated that there was neither a high degree of regulation suffi-
66. Moose Lodge, 163 U.S. at 176. The Lodge as an applicant for a club license had to
make such physical alterations in its premises as the Board might require, had to file a list of
names and addresses of its members and employees, and had to maintain extrinsic financial
records. Id. at 176-77.
67. Flagg Brs, 436 U.S. at 156.
68. Lugar, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 324. Although the Polk Court did not make the distinction between state actor
and pursuant to a government rule of conduct as did Lugar, the Lugar Court said the distinc-
tion could be culled from the the case. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 935 n.18.
71. Polk, 454 U.S. at 321.
72. Id.
73. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
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cient to turn the nursing homes into state actors, nor did the state,
through regulations, direct the nursing homes to operate in the manner
for which the cause of action was based.74
C. Application of Recent Supreme Court Decisions
In applying the Lugar two-pronged test, it is even more unlikely
that a state action existed in WPIX The first step in analyzing a state
action as set forth in Lugar is to determine whether or not the League
was a state actor.7 Under the "symbiotic relationship" test the state
must be involved in the League's activity in order to create a close rela-
tionship resulting in some form of interdependence. Regulation of a pri-
vate party is often used to show a relationship between the state and the
regulated entity. The WPIX court referred to the fact that a sitting presi-
dent and a former vice-president participated in deciding on the format
of the debates. Thus, the court assumed the government was involved in
the debates. This is a faulty assumption, for the candidates were only
acting as representatives of their respective political parties and not fulfil-
ling their duties as government representatives. The fallacy of this argu-
ment is bolstered by the fact that Vice-President Mondale did not hold
any political office at the time of the debates. Therefore, since the League
was not regulated by the state nor was it working with the state in
presenting the debates, this first test is not met.
The "public function" test was also not met. Political debates are
not traditionally exclusively reserved to the state. The Supreme Court
74. Id. The state of New York was a participant in the Federal Medicaid program. The
defendants, New York nursing homes, were directly reimbursed by the state for the reasonable
cost of health services with Medicaid funds. Federal regulations required each nursing home
to establish and use a review committee of physicians to determine whether a Medicaid as-
sisted patient should stay in the facility. The Blum Court conceded that the defendant nursing
homes were extensively regulated, but, reiterating the language in Jackson, 419 U.S. at 345,
concluded that "the mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself
convert its action into that of the state for the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
complaining party must also show that "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state
and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that action of the latter may be fairly
treated as that of the state itself." Id. at 1004.
The Blum Court also stated a second alternative for when a state action may exist: a state
normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice
must in law be deemed to be that of the state. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initia-
tives of a private party is not sufficient to justify finding the state to be responsible for these
initiatives under the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1005.
Finally, the Court presented a third situation in which a state action may exist. "The
required nexus may be present if the private entity has exercised powers that are 'traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the State.'" Id.
75. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 922. See supra note 50.
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has found that private parties holding electoral primaries are state ac-
tors.7 6 However, debates are distinguishable in that they are not an es-
sential element in the electoral process--debates do not determine who
will be chosen to run or hold a political office, nor do they affect whether
or not a citizen can vote. Therefore, the League in this case should not
be considered a state actor.
By holding debates, the League did not place itself in a position
where its conduct would be regulated and directed by the state, therefore
the "state compulsion" test was not met. As discussed, there is no regu-
latory scheme directing how debates should be handled.
Even if the League were to be considered a state actor, it would not
meet the second prong of the Lugar test: exercising some right or privi-
lege created by the state. The League was not acting pursuant to any
governmental regulatory scheme either authorizing political debates or
dictating how such debates should be conducted.
Therefore, under both requirements set forth in Lugar, the League's
conduct cannot logically be considered to constitute a state action.
To carve out a judicial exception for political debates and their cov-
erage may produce burdensome and generally undesirable ramifications.
For example, if the Supreme Court were to find a state action as did the
district court in WPIX, it could be argued that all candidates running for
elected office, the media, and other affected parties could be a subject to a
constitutionally based cause of action.77 The threat of litigation could
then produce the negative effect of discouraging organizations like the
League from holding debates. The public would then not even have the
opportunity to observe the main political party candidates debate, a
much worse result than being deprived of INN's coverage.
A second result could be that an organization holding a political
debate would require that all candidates be allowed to participate, which
in turn, would lead to the main political party candidates not participat-
ing in debates because of not wanting to contend with candidates from
fringe parties. The result would again be that the voters would be de-
prived of valuable information.
Finally, the sponsors of debates may be forced to allow such a large
number of media cameras to cover the debates that production of the
debates would not be practical. Or the courts could require an elaborate
means by which to decide who shall constitute a media pool and how it
76. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
77. This line of reasoning would give the President the "Midas Touch"---every event in
which he participates would turn into a state action. This is a result that hopefully no clear
thinking court would promote.
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should be managed. Sponsors of debates would then be discouraged
from holding debates or related public events because of the transaction
costs resulting from extensive regulation.
Alternatively, when considering the impact that media coverage has
on national as well as state elections-thus affecting the composition of
elected representatives-it is tempting to find a state action.78 It may be
desirable to bring only the presentation of debates under the scope of a
state action, since debates are so important to the electoral process.
However, to do this, the courts would have to completely revamp the
present state action doctrine, or create an unprincipled state action ex-
ception. Such an exception would be best accomplished by the legislative
branch. The legislature could establish a cause of action and remedies,
which would cover all aspects of equal access to political debates.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the Supreme Court has set out the state action test in Lugar, it is
very difficult to find that a private party's actions constitute a state ac-
tion. Although the standard is narrow, it is both predictable and sound.
Thus, Congress, through its legislative powers, should tailor a law regu-
lating political debates. Otherwise, a judicial exception as to the presen-
tation of political debates would result in many of the negative
ramifications discussed above, ramifications that would far outweigh the
positive benefits to the electoral process.
Timothy K Cutler
78. See American Broadcast Co. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080 (2d. Cir. 1977). This case
involved the exclusion of ABC's news representatives from covering the campaign facilities of
Mr. Koch and Mr. Cuomo during the Democratic mayoral race for New York City in 1977.
The candidates contended that their campaign facilities were private and only those with an
invitation should be allowed to enter. Additionally, the candidates pointed out that they were
not yet elected officials. However, the court held that it was not important that they were not
elected officials. Rather, the nature of the candidates was sufficient to bring the event within
the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 1084.
This case was decided before Lugar, and in light of Lugar, the district court probably
would not have found a state action, if the case was decided today.
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